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THE SUPREME COURT'S LEGAL CULTURE WAR
AGAINST TRIBAL LAW
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER*
I Tribal Law's Place in the American Legal Culture
A. Origins
Indian tribes have long governed themselves in a manner that
developed far different than the Anglo-American legal system. 
I
* Assistant Professor, Michigan State University College of Law; Director,
Indigenous Law and Policy Center; Appellate Judge, Hoopa Valley Tribe, Pokagon
Band of Potawatomi Indians, and Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians;
Enrolled Member, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians. Many
thanks to Siegfried Wiessner for the opportunity to present this work in progress at
the Seventh Tribal Sovereignty Symposium at St. Thomas University School of
Law, entitled "Sovereignty and Sustainable Development of Indigenous Peoples."
1 E.g., Watt v. Colville Reservation Court of Appeals, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6027
(Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation Ct. App. 1998) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); KEITH H. BASSO, WISDOM SITS 1N PLACES: LANDSCAPE AND
LANGUAGE AMONG THE WESTERN APACHE (1996); KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E.
ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW 1N PRIMITIVE
JURISPRUDENCE (1941); SHARON O'BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL
GOVERNMENTS 14-33 (1989); JOHN HOWARD PAYNE, INDIAN JUSTICE: A
CHEROKEE MURDER TRIAL AT TAHLEQUAH IN 1840 (Grand Foreman ed., 1962)
(1933); RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM
CLAN TO COURT (1975); JOHN R. WUNDER, "RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE": A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 5-15 (1994); Steve
Aycock, Thoughts on Creating a Truly Tribal Jurisprudence, unpublished
manuscript (2006) (on file with author); Ernest Beaglehole, Ownership and
Inheritance in an American Indian Tribe, 20 IOWA L. REV. 304 (1935); Bob L.
Blackburn, From Blood Revenge to the Lighthorsemen: Evolution of Law
Enforcement Institutions Among the Five Civilized Tribes to 1861, 8 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 49 (1980); Russel Lawrence Barsh, Putting the Tribe in Tribal Courts:
Possible? Desirable?, 8 KAN. J. L. PUB. POL'Y 74 (1999); Robert D. Cooter &
Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in American
Indian Tribal Courts (Pts. I & II), 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 287, 309 (1998); Sarah
Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 KAN. J. L. PUB. POL'Y
121, 129-30 (2004); Robert H. Lowie, Incorporeal Property in Primitive Society,
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Many indigenous cultures relied upon an oral tradition, inextricably
intertwined with their languages, to make the ways of their people
2known. In these cultures, social mores tied to the geographies of
traditional territories developed to ensure a form of law and order,
and social control existed sufficient to maintain the societies. 3 Many
indigenous cultures had written laws as well. 4
These rules survived after contact with the European nations
and survive today in modified form. 5 As indigenous societies
37 YALE L. J. 551 (1928); Joseph J. Thompson, Law Amongst the Aborigines of the
Mississippi Valley, 6 ILL. L.Q. 204 (1924); Ken Traisman, Native Law: Law and
Order Among Eighteenth-Century Cherokee, Great Plains, Central Prairie, and
Woodland Indians, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 273 (1981); Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes
From It": Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M.L. REV. 175 (1994).
2 E.g., LARRY EVERS & BARRE TOELKEN, NATIVE AMERICAN ORAL
TRADITIONS: COLLABORATION AND INTERPRETATION (2001); Glen Stohr, The
Repercussions of Orality in Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 679 (1999). See
generally JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL
STUDIES 19-31 (Jerry Gardner, ed., 2004).
3 E.g., BASSO, supra note 1, at 38-41, 51-57.
4 As to the modern written laws of the two most populous indigenous peoples
in the U.S., see, e.g., the four volumes of the NAVAJO TRIBAL CODE (1978) and the
CHEROKEE NATION CODE ANNOTATED (1986).
5 See FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE (1995); MARY SHEPARDSON, NAVAJO WAYS IN
GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN POLITICAL PROCESS (1963); Bethany R. Berger, Justice
and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1047 (2006); Kenneth Bobroff, Din Bi Beenahaz' anii: Codifying
Indigenous Consuetudinary Law in the 21st Century, 5 TRIBAL L.J. 4 (2004-2005);
Kristen A. Carpenter, Considering Individual Religious Freedoms under Tribal
Constitutional Law, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 561 (2005); Christine Zuni Cruz,
Tribal Law as Indigenous Social Reality and Separate Consciousness:
Reincorporating Customs and Traditions into Tribal Law, I TRIBAL L.J. 1 (2000);
Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian
Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285 (1998); Michael D. Petoskey, Tribal
Courts, 67 MICH. B.J. 366 (1988); Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Court
Jurisprudence: A Snapshot from the Field, 21 VT. L. REV. 7 (1996); Mark. D.
Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitution Federal Law: Qf
Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479 (2000);
Alex Tallchief Skibine, Troublesome Aspects of Western Influences on Tribal
Justice Systems and Laws, I TRIBAL L.J. 2 (2000); Michael Taylor, Modern
Practice in Indian Courts, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 231 (1987); James W. Zion
& Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Law in North America in the Wake of Conquest, 20
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reacted, changed, and sometimes all but died, their rules changed as
well. The introduction of European commerce, religion, and brutality
into indigenous communities forced these changes - and sometimes
these changes were radical. Underlying social mores of indigenous
communities changed as some communities maintained a state of
active hostility with the Europeans for months, years, decades, or
longer.6 And, as the European powers sought to enter into treaties
with indigenous communities, more and more Indian "tribes" with
titular heads began to develop. 7 As a general matter, it appears that
the more singular the tribal leadership, the less likely the tribe would
survive. In contrast, the more plural the tribal leadership, the more
likely the tribe would survive. Compare King Philip with the
Haudenosaunee and Three Fires Confederacies. 8 Despite this trend,
indigenous societies began to mirror European governments more
and more - hence, the rise of tribal government.
B. History
Tribal government was a necessity for European governments
and, later, the American government. Tribal government still remains
essential into the 21st Century, but a decidedly inconvenient
necessity, from the point of view of the American legal cultural
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 55 (1997).
6 E.g., RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND
REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650-1815 4-6 (1991) (cannibalism).
7 See Carol C. Lujan & Gordon Adams, U.S. Colonization of Indian Justice
Systems: A Brief History, 19 WICAZO SA. REV. 9 (2004); A. L. Kroeber, Nature of
the Land-Holding Group, 2 ETHNOHISTORY 303, 303-04 (1955).
' As is well known to observers of American Indian history, Indian
communities with diffuse leadership tended to survive contact with European
nations better than Indian communities with a titular head, often referred to
mistakenly as a "king." Cf generally ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR., THE PATRIOT
CHIEFS: A CHRONICLE OF AMERICAN INDIAN RESISTANCE 32-62 (1958) (King
Philip), with GEORGE L. CORNELL, The Potawatomi, in PEOPLE OF THE THREE
FIRES: THE OTTAWA, POTAWATOMI AND OJIBWAY OF MICHIGAN 38, 65-70 (1986)
(Leopold Pokagon and the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians); Robert B.
Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian Control
Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899 (1998) (Haudenosaunee).
20071
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establishment. 9 The history of tribal government and tribal law from
the time of the establishment of the American republic confirms this
notion of inconvenience.
Perhaps the most famous and useful example is the murder of
Spotted Tail by Crow Dog in the Dakota Territory. 10 While there are
alternative theories as to Crow Dog's motivation for assassinating
Spotted Tail, one theory is a microcosm of the problems related to
the development of tribal societies. In this theory, Spotted Tail
appeared to favor executing a treaty with the United States which
much of the tribe opposed. Crow Dog was the leader of an
opposition faction who eventually murdered Spotted Tail." In
accordance with the tribal custom of the time, the representatives of
the two families and other tribal leaders met for several days to
discuss Crow Dog's punishment. The Anglo-American notion of
indictment, trial by jury, and punishment was foreign to this tribal
community. 12 The community decided to punish Crow Dog by
requiring him to pay compensation of $600, eight horses, and a
blanket to the victim's family.1 3 Crow Dog was not executed or
jailed, as he could have been under American law; rather he was
punished according to Lakota custom and tradition. 14 Non-Indians,
9 E.g., Memorandum from John G. Roberts to Fred R. Fielding 1 (Nov. 30,
1983) (on file with author) (referring to a bill restoring lands to the Las Vegas
Paiute tribe and asserting that "[t]his bill essentially does nothing more than take
money from you, me, and everyone else and give it to 143 people in Nevada (about
$10,000 each), simply because they want it.").
10 See SIDNEY HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY (1994); B.J. Jones, Director, Tribal Judicial Institute, Northern Plains
Indian Law Center, University of North Dakota School of Law, Law Women's
Caucus Lecture, Domestic Violence in Indian Country (Oct. 17, 2005).
11 See CHARLES A. EASTMAN, INDIAN HEROES AND GREAT CHIEFTAINS 16
(Kessinger Publishing 2004) (1918).
12 See generally Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law,
104 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2006); Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and
Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779 (2006).
13 William Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts":
Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Pleafor Peace with Justice,
27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 243 (2002/2003).
14 Traci Hobson, Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: A Primer, 43
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fueled by local Indian agents, were enraged by what they viewed as a
lack of punishment. The local United States Attorney responded by
initiating a criminal prosecution against Crow Dog that was
overturned by the United States Supreme Court in Ex parte Crow
Dog. 15
Though the Court's decision in Crow Dog was notable for its
effect of preserving the tribal community's choices of criminal law,
procedure, and punishment, the Court's reasoning was undeniably
racist. The Court held that the United States had no criminal
jurisdiction over a crime committed by an Indian against another
Indian in Indian Country.1 6 It appears significant that the crime took
place in an American territory as opposed to an American state, but
the Court did not emphasize that question. Instead, the Court opined
that "civilized" American law should not apply to "savage" Indians
such as Crow Dog. ' 7 It is ironic that the Court prevented Crow Dog
from being executed by the American government because he was
not "civilized."
Congress' reaction, fueled once more by agitated Indian
agents, was to extend, via legislation, federal criminal jurisdiction
into Indian Country in the form of the Indian Major Crimes Act.' 8
Despite the fact that no specific provision in the Constitution
appeared to authorize Congress to take this action, the Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Act in United States v. Kagama.1
9
Consistent with the Crow Dog decision, the Court's reasoning in
Kagama again focused on the lack of civilization in tribal
communities, asserting that Indians were utterly and completely
dependent on the American government for protection and
education. 20
JUDGES' JOURNAL 35, n.18 (Winter 2004).
" Ex parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca (otherwise known as Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556
(1883).
16 Id. at 571-72.
17 Id. at 571.
18 18 U.S.C. § 1153
19 U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 385 (1886).
20 Id. at 379.
20071
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A contemporaneous lower court case captioned United States
v. Clapox exemplified the on-the-ground realities of tribal life, the
denigration of tribal cultures and law, and the power of non-Indians
in Indian communities during the late 19th Century. 2 1 Clapox upheld
the Secretary of Interior's authority to promulgate a Law and Order
22Code for tribal communities. Though the decision involved the
crime by an Indian of breaking an Indian out of a federal jail,23 the
underlying Law and Order Code is a far more important question.
The woman who had been jailed was there for adultery.24 The Code,
typical for the time, criminalized adultery, as well as tribal
ceremonies, dances, religious practices, and everything else that
made the tribal community distinct from American communities.
25
The district court's reasoning in Clapox again focused on the
savagery of tribal peoples and relied upon a supposed need for
American laws to civilize and assimilate Indians in the guise of
saving them from extinction. 2 6 Clapox exemplifies the fact that the
choices made by tribal communities for change to their legal systems
and governing structures came from outside factors during this time.
The ravages of American domination of tribal communities
forced tribal culture and tribal law into the underground.27 Federal
legislation drove federal Indian policy, dragging tribal culture and
law with it. The Allotment Era28 opened up reservations to non-
Indian settlement, 29  undermining the notion of "measured
21 U.S. v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888).
22 Id. at 576.
23 Id. at 575.
24 Id. at 576.
25 The United States currently has statutory provisions enabling it to enact
regulations to manage and govern all Indian affairs. See 25 U.S.C. § 2, 9.
26 Clapox, 35 F. at 579.
27 See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 5, at 21.
21 See Kenneth Ha. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and
the Myth of Common Owenership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1560 (2001). During
the Allotment Era Congress authorized the Indian reservations to be divided into
individual tracts of land.
29 See Bobroff, supra note 28, at 1570; Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of
Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 13 (1995).
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separatism"' 30 useful to the maintenance, repair, and growth of tribal
governance structures. Tribal governments had the chance to make
few choices of their own after Congress and the Executive branch
allowed non-Indians to enter into Indian Country.
The pervasive influence and power of non-Indians,
particularly Indian agents and missionaries, in tribal communities in
the late 19th to the mid-20th Centuries obstructed the continued
development of tribal culture and tribal law.31 As Professor Frank
Pommersheim noted, the first major treatise of American Indian law
did not discuss tribal law or governance systems in any detail
because they were dormant or nonexistent. 32
Many tribal governments and tribal justice systems have
never recovered from these changes forced from outside. Congress
attempted to restore a semblance of tribal self-governance by
enacting the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, 33 but the intent and
practical operation of this reformist legislation still was to encourage
Indian tribes to adopt governments and laws mirroring Anglo-
American legal structures. 34 Moreover, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
did not relinquish its powerful grip on much of Indian Country for
decades 35 - and then only in a gradual manner.
C. The "Permissive" Modern Era
By 1970, the policymaking branches of the federal
government recognized the principle of tribal self-determination.
36
30 CHARLES WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 1 (1987).
"Measured separatism" is a term of art coined by Professor Wilkinson to describe
the policy of the United States to keep American citizens apart from American
Indian communities.
31 See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 5, at 21.
32 See id. at 54.
3I Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461, et seq.
34 See Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REV. 955 (1972).
35 See Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study
in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L. J. 348 (1953).
36 See WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 57-59.
20071
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However, it was the Supreme Court that acknowledged the value of
tribal self-government in Williams v. Lee.37 The case arose on the
vast Navajo Reservation in Arizona, where a non-Indian store owner
sued a Navajo Indian in Arizona state court for collection of a small
debt.38 The Court held that the Arizona state court had no
jurisdiction over such a claim. 39 The Court reasoned that the Navajo
Nation had its own nascent court system, again mirroring the
American court system, and to allow state court jurisdiction over
such a claim would be a severe detriment to the development of the
Navajo Nation's court system and sovereignty. 40 The tone of this
opinion was a drastic change from the tone of opinions like Crow
Dog and Clapox.
At the time of Williams, numerous Indian tribes had a local
court system, but they often were not organic legal structures. These
courts, frequently called Courts of Indian Offenses or "CFR Courts,"
were derivatives of the Law and Order Codes imposed by the
Department of Interior on tribal communities. 4' Like the Law and
Order Codes of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, these courts
were designed to "acculturate[e] and civilize[e]" Indian people. 42 By
the time of the Williams decision, the impact of these courts had been
felt in many tribal communities for many decades and had already
done the work they had come to do. Under the auspices of the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA),43 tribal communities slowly took more
control over these courts, but they had lost much of their import. The
Court's reference in Williams to the Navajo Nation's court system
was no doubt a reference to the CFR Courts in operation there. 44 It is
possible that these courts, due to their reputation as tools of
assimilation and injustice, had little utility to tribal communities by
17 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 223.
40 Id. at 222.
41 See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS,
AMERICAN JUSTICE 82-89 (1983); POMMERSHEIM, supra note 5, at 61-63
42 POMMERSHEIM, supra note 5, at 63.
4, Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §461 et. seq. (2000).
44 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 at 222.
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the 1950s.
Williams was followed by a series of Supreme Court
decisions in the 1960s and 1970s that supported the restoration of
tribal governance structures and sovereignty. In these cases, the
Court limited the authority of state and local governments to tax and
regulate Indians and Indian tribes in Indian Country,45 the authority
of tribes to prosecute tribal members, 46 and upheld the reserved
treaty rights of Indians and Indian tribes.47 The most important of
these cases was Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.48 There, the Court
held that Indian tribes possess immunity from suit similar to that
possessed by the state and federal sovereigns in the American legal
system. 49 Moreover, the Court held that no court, other than a tribe's
own, had jurisdiction to hear cases arising out of a tribe's internal
affairs. 50
These cases, referred to by Professor Charles Wilkinson as
the beginning of the modem era of American Indian law,5' were
paralleled by the increasing support of Congress and the Executive
branch for tribal self-determination. Congress enacted several pieces
of legislation intended to allow and encourage tribal governments to
develop their internal governance structures and to improve their
ability to generate governmental revenues, often through economic
development activities. 52 "[T]oday, [tribal law] is where the action is
in Indian law." 5
3
45 E.g., Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S.
832 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Cent.
Mach. Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); McClanahan v. State Tax
Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Warren Trading Post v. Ariz. Tax
Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
46 See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
47 E.g., Wash. v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658 (1979); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dept. of Game of the State of Wash.,
433 U.S. 165 (1977).
48 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978).
49 Id. at 72.
50 Id.
51 See WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 7-28.
52 Id.
53 POMMERSHEIM, supra note 5, at 54.
20071
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D. The "Restrictive" Modern Era
The Supreme Court's permissive modern era began to grind
to a halt in the late-1970s. Though Indian tribes would continue to
win a fair number of the cases reaching the Court, many of the
advances made during the permissive modern era would be rolled
back. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Court held that
Indian tribes do not retain criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 54
This ruling impeded the advances that tribal courts had been making
in the 1960s and 1970s and created a major law enforcement
jurisdictional gap in Indian Country, even in states where Congress
had extended criminal jurisdiction into Indian Country. The Court's
opinion 55 reintroduced in powerful fashion the standardless and
ambiguous doctrine wherein the Supreme Court can hold that certain
retained, inherent powers of tribal governments can be implicitly
divested if the Court finds they are inconsistent with a tribe's
dependent status. 
56
Following the reasoning of Oliphant, the Court has chipped
away at the civil regulatory jurisdiction of Indian tribes and the civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction of tribal courts. Starting with Montana v.
United States, where the Court announced a presumption that Indian
tribes do not have civil jurisdiction over nonmembers absent two
exceptions, 57 Indian tribes have been able to exercise governmental
authority over nonmembers to the satisfaction of the Court in few
cases. More often than not, the Court has held that tribal authority to
regulate, tax, or adjudicate the rights of nonmembers has been
implicitly divested.58
54 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
55 This court opinion was a Justice Rehnquist-authored mishmash of
revisionist history; selective use of federal legislative history, treaty language, and
Solicitor's Opinions, and reliance upon one federal district court opinion written by
a personal hero of Justice Rehnquist.
56 Cf U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (defining "implicit
divestiture" as "that part of sovereignty which the Indian implicitly lost by virtue
of their dependent status").
57 Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1980).
58 See generally David Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's
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II. The Supreme Court's View of Tribal Law.
A Legal Culture War?
The Court has taken a very crabbed view of tribal sovereignty
in the past two decades. The doctrine of implicit divestiture, for
example, has led many scholars and judges to conclude that the
Supreme Court - not Congress or the Executive branch - has the
final say in federal Indian law and policy. 59 The irony of the
restrictive modern era of American Indian law is that the more
capacity to govern acquired by Indian tribes, the less the Court
appears willing to allow the tribes to govern. Given the opaque
character of the Court's Indian cases, it is difficult to discern what
drives the Court's jurisprudence in this area. A few themes appear to
underlie the Court's view. The first is what Dean Alexander
Aleinikoff refers to as the "democratic deficit" in relation to
nonmember political participation in tribal government. 6' Second is
Justice Souter's allegation that tribal law is "unusually difficult for
an outsider" to understand.62 Professor Philip Frickey argues that the
Court has adopted an attitude of "ruthless pragmatism" as a result of
these concerns when it comes to tribal-state jurisdictional disputes
and tribal-nonmember jurisdictional disputes. 63 All three threads of
Pursuit of States'Rights, Colorblind Justice, and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 267 (2001); David Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1573 (1996);
Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism in Indian Law and the
Rehnquist Court: The Need for Coherence and Integration, 8 TEX. F. ON C.L. &
C.R. 1 (2003).
59 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy,
85 NEB. L. REV. 121 (2006); Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism
in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 459-60 (2005); Frank
Pommersheim, Present Moment: A Zen Reflection on Indian Law Doctrine, 2
UCLA INDIGENOUS PEOPLES J.L. CULTURE & RESISTANCE 104, 104 (2005);
Joseph William Singer, Double Bind: Indian Nations v. The Supreme Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 2 (2005).
60 See Singer, supra note 59, at 1-2.
61 T. ALEXANDER ALETNIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 115 (Harvard University
Press) (2002).
62 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 385 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).
63 Frickey, supra note 59, at 436.
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Supreme Court reasoning undervalue and debilitate the development
of tribal law and tribal justice systems.
A. "Democratic Deficit"
The American governance structure is based on the Lockean,
fictional notion of the "consent of the governed., 64 Without the
consent of American citizens, American government would become
invalid and cease to exist in a manner similar to how the British
government became invalid during the American Revolution. The
notion of the "consent of the governed" derives from that time in
history. Consent is not explicit - few, if any, sign a paper saying they
consent to American governance under the United States
Constitution. Indian tribes, for example, "[i]n Lockean social
compact terms,... never entered into or consented to any
constitutional contract by which they agreed to be governed by
federal or state authority, rather than by tribal sovereignty. "
65
Consent is implicit and is inferred by status as an American citizen or
even by a non-citizen's presence in an American jurisdiction. Despite
the fictitious aspects of the "consent of the governed" theory, it is a
powerful political concept.
Unlike the American republic, most Indian tribes did not
originate as part of a revolution. In fact, as noted above, the concept
of a "tribe" is a foreign concept imposed on indigenous communities
by Euro-American governments. 66 Indigenous communities that
were once loose amalgamations of families and communities
speaking the same language and living life in a similar manner
became, over many decades, Indian tribes governed by tribal
government structures. These tribal governments, more often than
not, mirror American government structures. American intervention
into traditional indigenous communities had the effect of importing a
form of the notion of the "consent of the governed" into tribal
64 See U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
result).
65 Robert Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 841, 847 (1990).
66 See Lujan & Adams, supra note 7; see also Kroeber, supra note 7.
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governance. As a result, like people who are or can become
American "citizens," individual Indians are or can become tribal
"citizens" or "members." It may be that the overarching theme of the
"consent of the governed" notion may not be all that different than
pre-colonial contact indigenous governance. Many Indian people
might agree that the notion of government by consensus studied at
great length by legal anthropologists meant that people who didn't
agree with the choices of the community leadership would leave the
community, what we might now think of as "banishment" or even
"disenrollment."
67
Some Justices, particularly Justice Kennedy, have stated that
despite the likelihood that tribal governments mirror American-style
governments, there is no way to imply that nonmembers have
consented to be governed by Indian tribes. 68 Indian tribes are outside
the American constitutional structure of federal, territorial, state, and
state subdivision governments. The United States Constitution did
not create these tribal governments and no amendment to the
Constitution incorporates them into the American constitutional
family. Justice Kennedy appears concerned that nonmembers had no
say in the creation and development of these justice systems and that,
because of the restrictive requirements of tribal citizenship, they
might never have the right to participation in the tribal political
process.
69
As I have stated elsewhere, the so-called problem of the
"democratic deficit" is an illusion.70 To borrow an old analogy, a
resident and citizen of Colorado who defaults on a loan in Utah may
be subject to the legal processes of Utah, even though she is not a
citizen there. 71 The Court would focus on the possibility that she has
legal status sufficient to some day acquire citizenship in Utah, in
contrast to a non-Indian who might not have that status. But at the
67 Thanks to Sam Deloria for pointing this out.
68 E.g., Lara, 541 U.S. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
69 Id.
70 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country,
53 FED. LAW. March/April 2006, at 38, 40.
71 Thanks to Kristen Carpenter for suggesting this analogy.
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time the Colorado citizen's loan is adjudicated, she is not a citizen of
Utah. Moreover, should the Colorado citizen move to Utah and
become a citizen of Utah, her changed status could not alter the
result the Utah courts' adjudication of her loan. Professor Frickey
likewise criticizes Justice Kennedy's approach as "question-
begging."
72
B. "Unusually Difficult"
Justice Souter has articulated a related concern that tribal law
is "unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out."' 73 This line of
argument appears to rest on the notion that nonmember litigants will
be surprised by tribal law, an unknown commodity. Justice Souter
implies that tribal court procedures differ in some respects from
federal, state, and local courts, putting nonmember litigants at a
disadvantage. 74 A more fundamental tenet of Justice Souter's
argument appears to be that substantive tribal law is unknown and
even unknowable by outsiders. 
75
Like the "democratic deficit," this argument is an illusion as
well. American citizens are charged with knowing the law when they
travel to other jurisdictions, just as they are subject to the jurisdiction
of unfamiliar state and local courts. Tribal law is sometimes difficult
to find. Some courts and tribes have little or no tribal common or
positive law and do not have the resources to make their law
available, but that should not act as an excuse in every tribal
jurisdiction. No tribal court procedure is secret and no tribal law is
kept from nonmember litigants for the purpose of surprising them in
an unfair manner. Any litigant conducting a reasonable amount of
legal research can discover tribal law. Moreover, mainstream law
libraries and bar journals are working to shine light on tribal law. 76
72 Frickey, supra note 59, at 466.
7, Hicks, 533 U.S. at 385 (Souter, J., concurring).
74 Id. at 384 
- 385
75 Id. at 385.
76 E.g., Gabriel S. Galanda, Reservations of Right: A Practitioner's Guide to
Indian Law in Montana, 28 MONT. LAW. 7, Jan. 2003; Amy Gannaway,
Researching American Indian Law Online, 78 Wis. LAW. 20, July 2005; David
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Justice Souter's concerns should have no serious import for
another reason. It is unfortunate that he quoted Ada Pecos Melton's
excellent and inspiring piece about the development of tribal law as
if the development of a separate and culturally-sensitive tribal law
was a bad thing,77 rendering tribal law "unusually difficult for an
outsider to sort out.' 78 He noted that the U.S. Constitution and the
Bill of Rights do not constrain tribal governments. 79 Justice Souter
further stated that "there is a 'definite trend by tribal courts' toward
the view that they 'ha[ve] leeway in interpreting' the ICRA's due
process and equal protection clauses and 'need not follow the U.S.
Supreme Court precedents 'jot-for-jot."" 80 Ada Melton's piece
appears in a compilation of articles celebrating the differences and
cultural sensitivity of tribal courts side by side with important and
influential scholars, policymakers, and judges, including Yale law
professor Judith Resnik, 81 former United States Attorney General
Janet Reno, 82 former Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit J. Clifford
Wallace, 83 and former Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court
Stanley G. Feldman. 84 These authors were cognizant of both the
advantages and the concerns that arise when a "Third Sovereign," as
Selden & Monica Martens, Basic Indian Law Research Tips Part H: Tribal Law,
34 COLO. LAW. 115, Aug. 2005.
77 See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Ada Pecos
Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society, 79 JUDICATURE 126, 130-
31, Nov./Dec. 1995).
78 Id. at 385 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1302).
79 Id. The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) (25 U.S.C. § 1302) appears to be
the most significant federal statute restricting tribal governments.
80 Id. (quoting Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life
of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 344 n. 238 (1998)).
Nell Jessup Newton, Chancellor and Dean of University of California-Hastings
College of Law, is a powerful voice for the development of tribal law.
81 See Judith Resnik, Multiple Sovereignties: Indian Tribes, States, and the
Federal Government, 79 JUDICATURE 118, Nov./Dec. 1995.
82 See Janet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, 79
JUDICATURE 113, Nov./Dec 1995.
83 See J. Clifford Wallace, A New Era of Federal-Tribal Cooperation, 79
JUDICATURE 150, Nov./Dec 1995.
84 See Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Withey, Resolving state-tribal
jurisdictional dilemmas, 79 JUDICATURE 154, Nov./Dec 1995.
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Justice O'Connor once characterized Indian tribes,85 exercises
regulatory, prohibitory, or adjudicatory jurisdiction over American
citizens.8 6 Justice Souter worried that every tribe has taken a
combination of traditional Indigenous law and custom and merged
that with a combination of Anglo-American law and procedure.
8 7
With each of the 560-plus Indian tribes operating under a different
permutation of their own internal jurisprudence, 88 Justice Souter
seems to be saying that no outsider could know the law of a specific
tribe.89
Again, this is no different than the American "laboratory" of
democracy, with Justice Brandeis famously arguing that each state is
charged with trying innovative procedures and substantive laws, with
the best of these innovations rising to the top for the advantage of the
rest of the nation. 90 This argument is also blunted by the fact that
tribal substantive law is not a secret. The very fact that Justice Souter
relied on legal commentators tends to prove that tribal law can be
discovered with reasonable effort. Innovators in tribal law tend to be
scholars, academics, and practitioners that have every interest in
publicizing those innovations to the legal and political community.
Finally, despite the valid concerns of tribal law commentators, it is
very possible that tribal courts are moving toward an intertribal
common law. 91 Most tribal court jurisprudence that is available to a
wide audience exemplifies this possible trend.
Justice Souter concurred in the Nevada v. Hicks majority
85 Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign, 33 TULSA L.J. 1
(1997).
86 See Resnick, supra note 81; Reno, supra note 82; Wallace, supra note 83;
Feldman, supra note 84.
87 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001).
88 WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 7.
89 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384.
90 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
91 Thanks for Sam Deloria for pointing this out as well. See generally
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Toward a Theory of Intertribal and Intratribal Common
Law, 43 HOUSTON L. REV. 701 (2006).
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opinion, but his separate concurrence appears to have a specific
purpose: the first shot off the bow of tribal law. The result in Hicks
could be limited to its facts - a state officer with qualified immunity
being sued in tribal courts - and might not apply to nonmembers
without a claim to immunity from suit. 92 In dicta, the Hicks majority
stated that tribal courts might have presumptive civil jurisdiction
over the activities of nonmembers on Indian lands. 93 Unlike in
criminal jurisdiction cases, where there was not much of a legal track
record for the Court to follow, in civil cases, the Court has been able
to identify very positive aspects of tribal courts, their connection to
tribal law and the preservation of tribal culture. Justice Marshall's
opinion in Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante drew upon
the linkage between tribal law and tribal culture.94 Since then,
however, the Court and Indian law scholarship appears to have
forgotten that linkage. The Court needs to be able to draw upon
tangible evidence that there is a linkage between tribal law and tribal
culture in order to see the light.
Since the presumption is dicta, the question remains open.
The problem for tribal advocates is that Justice Souter has a five-year
head start in the debate over the difficulty of tribal law for outsiders,
a debate he has had the advantage of framing. However, even within
Justice Souter's frame, there is room for Indian tribes to prove that
tribal law as it applies to nonmembers is not difficult to sort out
92 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 358 n. 2 ("Our holding in this case is limited to the
question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law.").
93 Id. ("In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 137
L.Ed.2d 661 (1997), however, we assumed that 'where tribes possess authority to
regulate the activities of nonmembers, civil jurisdiction over disputes arising out of
such activities presumably lies in the tribal courts,' without distinguishing between
nonmember plaintiffs and nonmember defendants. See also Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v.
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18, 107 S. Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987). We leave open the
question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general.").
94 LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 16-17. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985) ("Exhaustion of tribal court remedies,
moreover, will encourage tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise basis for
accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide other courts with the benefit of their
expertise in such matters in the event of further judicial review.") (citing North
Dakota ex rel. Wefald v. Kelly, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6059 (1983); Crow Creek Sioux
Tribe v. Buum, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6031 (1983)).
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because it is not all that different from American law.
One major problem for tribal advocates is that the federal
judiciary is not equipped to understand the point of view of Indian
tribes. The original draft of the IRA included a proposal to create the
Federal Court of Indian affairs, which would hear cases arising out of
Indian Country or involving Indian tribes.95 Similar to the Federal
Court of Claims and the Federal Circuit, that court would have had
expertise in Indian affairs. Congress nixed that proposal, leaving the
vast majority of Indian law cases to arise in the Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits, with a few cases sprinkled around in other circuits
and in state courts located in states with large amounts of Indian
Country. A very small number of federal judges have expertise in
Indian law and few, if any, of their law clerks have ever been
exposed to American Indian law. The origin of Justice Souter's
concern may rest in part in the ignorance of legal elites in federal
Indian law concepts. However, difficulty in learning the law is no
excuse for refusing to apply or respect it.
C. "Ruthless Pragmatism"
Professor Frickey identifies a more amorphous and
overarching issue where the Court, frustrated with Congress's refusal
to enact an omnibus solution to tribal-state-local jurisdictional
questions, decides its Indian cases on an ad hoc basis underscored
with a "ruthless pragmatism.' 96 In the past decades, the Court often
has noted its desire for more bright-line rules while deciding Indian
cases on a case-by-case basis, expecting Congress to legislate future
solutions. 97 Congress has not enacted omnibus legislation to resolve
95 See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 5, at 64-65.
96 Frickey, supra note 59, at 436. See also id. at 459-60.
97 See Frickey, supra note 59, at 459-60 ("Instead, it seems plain that the trend
has been motivated by a judicial sense that Congress has failed to step in and fix a
myriad of festering local problems by eliminating tribal authority. The Court has
become colonialism's handyman, jerry-rigging a ruthlessly pragmatic blend of
federal Indian law with general American law. Without any apparent sense of its
normative and practical importance, the most commonly invoked protection of
tribal interests under American law narrow interpretation of existing positive
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these disputes, nor is Congress even considering that kind of
legislation. Professor Frickey suggests that the Court is frustrated by
Congress's inaction." Further, he argues that the Court is frustrated
that Congress has not resolved these inter-sovereign disputes in favor
of the states and local governments.
99
The Court of the last two decades, confronted with taxation
and regulatory disputes between sovereigns or with challenges to
tribal regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction, tends to resolve those
disputes in favor of non-Indian governments and nonmembers.1
00
Scholars charge that the Court is making its own federal Indian
policy in a perceived Congressional and Executive branch policy
void. 1 1 Given that the Constitution does not incorporate Indian
tribes into the federal system, some scholars even charge that the
Court views itself as the final arbiter of federal Indian law, a sort of
judicial plenary power over Indian affairs.' °2 Dean David Getches
suggested that the Court, painting on what it views as an empty or
out-of-date canvas of federal Indian law and policy, decides its
Indian cases in a manner that betrays its Membership's general
conservatism, ideological bent in favor of states' rights, and
law, thereby ordinarily putting the burden of congressional inertia upon tribal
opponents-is being displaced by a newfound willingness of Justices to engage in
case-by-case adjudication that almost always dismisses tribal prerogatives as
inconsistent with the broader legal landscape.").
98 Frickey, supra note 59, at 436.
99 Id.
100 E.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005);
City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (2004);
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520 (1999);
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
101 See Frickey, supra note 59, at 459-60.
102 See id. at 436 ("Frustration with the intractability of the issues has recently
led several Justices to propose that the Court should have not only the first say on
sensitive issues, but the final say as well."). See also id. at 460 ("Concerns about
the exceptionalism of Indian law have even led some Justices to suggest that the
Court, not Congress, should have the final say about some matters. That they
would embrace this notion indicates their impatience with the field and their sense
that they should not just take on the frontline responsibility of harmonizing it with
the broader general law, but have ultimate control over it as well. This shift of
authority would be a remarkable inversion of the longstanding approach of
congressional plenary power and judicial deference.").
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suspicion of minority rights. 103
The decisions of the restrictive modern era have worked to
eviscerate tribal law enforcement and public safety capabilities,
reduce control over the reservation environment, denigrate tribal and
individual Indian rights, curb tribal economic development, and limit
tribal government revenue streams. The Court's decisions have
worked to stunt the development and growth of tribal justice
systems. However, these decisions evidence a greater concern from
the Justices that perhaps Indian tribes, tribal self-government, and
tribal law do not fit within the legal culture of the United States. 1
04
Given that the federal policy toward Indian affairs since
1934, with its flaws and inconsistencies, has tended toward an
outright rejection of total assimilation of tribal cultures into the
American mainstream, the Court's application of these values is in
direct conflict with the preservation and development of tribal self-
government. To the most cynical, the Court's decisions point to an
endgame where the Court devalues and erodes tribal self-government
and tribal law sufficient to solve this entire "Indian problem." The
result is another name for assimilation.
A drive toward assimilation is present in civil rights cases, for
example, as well. Professor Kenji Yoshino identified the trend of the
federal judiciary toward this form of assimilation. 0 5 Justice Scalia
103 See Getches, supra note 58; Skibine, supra note 58.
104 See Frickey, supra note 59, at 467 ("Justice Kennedy's line of reasoning
exemplifies the root problem in federal Indian law. The place of federal Indian law
in American public law can be understood by imagining layers of law, with
American constitutionalism built on top of American colonialism. Above the
colonial line, America has what amounts to a civil religion of constitutionalism.
Justice Kennedy is one of many believers who have in the Constitution a 'faith
[that] is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.' This
constitutional faith may be crushed when the eye drifts below the colonial line,
which is presumably one reason why most eyes never venture that far. I say 'may
be' rather than 'is' because a true believer like Justice Kennedy might respond to
the problem not by a loss of faith, but by a call to missionary work. For in both
Duro and his separate opinion in Lara, Justice Kennedy has sought to bring our
civil religion to Indian country.") (quoting Hebrews 11:1 (King James)).
105 See Kenji Yoshino, The Pressure to Cover, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, § 6
at 2. See also KENJI YOSH1NO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL
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identified a concern that "politically powerful minorities" would
upset the fundamental balance of individual and government interests
the Court has been crafting during the Rehnquist Court. In Romer v.
Evans,106 the Court struck down Amendment 2 to the Colorado
Constitution, 10 7 an amendment that had "prohibit[ed] all legislative,
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government
designed to protect.., homosexual persons or gays and lesbians."
10 8
In the dissent, Justice Scalia argued that Amendment 2 was "rather a
modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve
traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful
minority to revise those mores through use of the laws." 109 For
Justice Scalia, the majority in Romer ("lawyer class"1 10) had
committed a damnable sin: "tak[ing] sides in [a] culture war."11' In
Romer, it appeared that Justice Scalia equated "homosexual persons
or gays and lesbians" as "a politically powerful minority." 12 Perhaps
Justice Scalia sought to invoke the threat of the "factions" of the
Federalist Papers. 113 Does the Supreme Court view Indian tribes as
similar to these "factions"?
In some quarters, mainstream American society views Indian
tribes as "politically powerful minorities" who trample on the
individual rights of nonmembers and members alike. One article,
discussing a sex harassment claim brought against a tribal casino
dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds, stated
And the entire case lifts the curtain on the increasingly
controversial relationship between U.S. citizens employed
by Indian casinos - most of them non-Indian - and the
sovereignty of Native American governments, which are
immune from many state and federal laws. The women
RIGHTS (2006).
106 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
107 [d. at 635.
'0' Id. at 624.
'09 Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
l"0 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111 Id. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 620.
113 See FEDERALIST PAPERS Nos. 9-10.
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involved in the lawsuit had no idea that when they went to
work at Thunder Valley, they signed away many of the
protections other working people in this country take for
granted. 114
Members of some tribes, many of them sorting out
membership criteria after decades of federal meddling and just
beginning to institute difficult disenrollment proceedings, complain
of the power of Indian tribes as well. 
115
There may always be a fundamental conflict between
mainstream values of the melting pot and the measured separatism of
Indian tribes, but assimilating Indian tribes into the American legal
culture may be a significant step toward destroying tribal cultures
within the United States. Perhaps at some level, the Court appears to
recognize that tribal law is necessary to protect tribal culture.
Professor Joseph Singer suggests that the Court is "not equipped" to
bring the final axe down on tribal law,116 but little in the Constitution
prevents that result. In fact, Professor Philip Frickey worries that a
minority of Justices have every intention of bringing the American
legal culture into Indian Country as a replacement for what is
developing there in the form of tribal law. 1 7 It appears that the Court
walks a fine line between final termination of tribal law and culture
with its incorporation of the American legal culture into Indian
Country.
114 Peter Byrne, Taking on a Nation, Salon.com, available at
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/01/13 /thunder valley /index np.html.
115 See, e.g, Jon Velie, Should the United States Be Fighting for Jim Crow's
Survival By Its Complicity in Denying Voting Rights to the Cherokee Freedmen?,
54 FED. LAW. 43 (2007),
116 Singer, supra note 59, at 2 ("Yet the Supreme Court cannot live without
them either; much as the Court would like to limit tribal sovereignty, it is neither
equipped nor inclined to erase tribal sovereignty entirely. Indian nations are not
only mentioned in the Constitution, but are also subject of an entire Title of the
United States Code. Writing Indians out of the Constitution and deleting Title 25
of the U.S. Code would appear to be beyond the legitimate powers of the Court.").
117 See Frickey, supra note 59, at 467.
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III. The False Threat Posed by Tribal Law
The opaque, underlying reasons the Supreme Court has
chosen to restrict tribal government authority and stunt tribal court
development are illusions. While scholars suggest that the Court's
implied legal and policy concerns described in Part II are derived
from the inherent racism of the Court as an institution,' 8 or
ignorance of America's indigenous peoples and governments, or the
Court's ideology of Our Federalism, 19 it is beyond the scope of this
Article to explain the deeper psychological, political, and personal
foundation of this recent development in American Indian Law. This
Part aims to respond to the apparent legal and policy concerns the
Court relies upon when deciding its cases. These concerns, based in
part on the Court's assumptions about Indian people and tribal
governments, should be allayed by shedding light on the actual
operations of tribal courts and the actual application of tribal law.
This Part argues that the Court's concern about the
"democratic deficit" in tribal political systems is a red herring. First,
this Part will analyze the empirical research of Professor Bethany
Berger to show that tribal courts do not decide cases to the detriment
of nonmembers or "outsiders." 120 Professor Berger's work is
persuasive in showing that the Navajo Nation's tribal courts have
little or no bias against outsiders and that outsiders win trial court
cases as often as Navajo Nation members. 121 Given the insularity of
the Navajo community, the fact that the tribal court does not
prejudice outsiders is significant.
The remaining two subparts provide a theoretical explanation
for these results. The second subpart will show that tribal law's
"difficulty" to outsiders exists in a continuum. The more arcane and
obscure the particular elements of tribal law, the less likely that law
will apply in a case where a nonmember is a party. Tribal court cases
involving nonmembers frequently tend to be routine, with their
118 See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST
COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005).
119 See Getches, supra note 58; Skibine, supra note 58.
120 Berger, supra note 5, at 1067-97.
121 See id.
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outcomes dependent upon tribal law that mirrors Anglo-American
rules. The third subpart will show that there exists a similar
continuum between the substantive fairness of tribal law and the
procedural fairness of tribal government exercises of authority and
tribal court adjudication. Tribal substantive law constitutes a series of
choices made by sovereign tribal communities that should not be
second-guessed by non-Indian polities. Tribal government and tribal
court procedures are apt to mirror Anglo-American procedures. The
following charts provide a possible explanation for why tribal law
does not tend to prejudice nonmembers or outsiders.
Tribal Law Continuum: Tribal Custom and Tribal Law Mirroring
Tribal Members Tradition Anglo-American Law
Tribal Substantive Law: Full Application Full Application
Tribal Procedural Law: Full Application Full Application
Tribal Law Continuum: Tribal Custom and Tribal Law Mirroring
Nonmembers Tradition Anglo-American Law
Tribal Substantive Law: Limited or no Full Application
Application
Tribal Procedural Law: Limited or no Full Application
Application
A. Fairness to Nonmembers
Tribal law does not prejudice nonmembers. As tribal courts
develop and grow, hearing more cases involving more complex
issues, there is evidence to suggest that tribal courts do not treat
nonmembers in an unfair manner. In the author's experience
litigating cases before the Pascua Yaqui, Hoopa, Suquamish, and
Grand Traverse Band tribal courts, the courts have shown no
discernable bias toward nonmembers. If any bias exists in these
courts, it is a small bias in civil cases favoring tribal members against
the tribal government. 122 Just as Indian people, tribal courts treat
122 E.g., Stewart v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No.
02-01-784- CV, slip op. at I (ruling regarding de novo review of tribal government
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nonmembers as visitors entitled to highest level of dignity, respect,
and generosity. 123 Nonmember litigants including nonmember
counsel for member parties that bring their own inherent biases and
assumptions into tribal court proceedings tend to generate the
allegations of bias and incompetence against tribal courts and judges.
For example, a nonmember attorney who does not prepare in
advance of appearing before a tribal court is less likely to achieve a
favorable outcome for his or her client. 124 Many nonmember
attorneys, for whatever reason, do not take the time to review tribal
court procedures or even read the applicable law before appearing in
court. These unprepared attorneys who do not achieve their desired
outcomes in tribal courts tend to allege bias and incompetence.
125
And the sad fact is that other nonmember attorneys, policymaker,
and individuals are prone to believing those allegations. 26 These
allegations against tribal courts are as false as they are in state or
local courts. Other nonmember litigants seeking to limit tribal court
jurisdiction over them do so because they wish to avoid liability for
employee appeal of employment termination) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct.
Oct. 21, 2002) (on file with author).
123 See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 5, at 10.
124 Many nonmembers challenge tribal court jurisdiction only after losing
before the tribal court. A recent decision from the Ninth Circuit exemplifies this
point. See Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127, 1129-30 (9th Cir.
2006) ("Following the unfavorable verdict, Smith argued for the first time that the
tribal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. He first sought post-judgment
relief in tribal court. At the same time, he filed an appeal of the judgment with the
tribal appeals court, which remanded to the tribal trial court to determine
jurisdiction. The tribal court determined that it had jurisdiction, and Smith again
filed an appeal with the tribal appeals court. While his second tribal-court appeal
was pending, Smith filed a motion for an injunction in federal district court on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, and sought to file his cross-claim as an original
complaint in that court.").
125 As an attorney representing Indian tribes in several tribal courts around the
United States, the author often has heard allegations of tribal court bias or
incompetence from opposing counsel. The per curiam opinion in Bank of Hoven v.
Long Family Land and Cattle Co., Inc., described how counsel for non-Indian
interests in a tribal court contracts claim asserted that non-Indian banks and lenders
"were watching this case," a veiled accusation of bias and incompetence. 32 Indian
L. Rep. 6001, 6006 (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court of Appeals 2004).
126 See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 5, at 12.
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gruesome or reprehensible acts, not because of some vague political
fairness notion. 1
27
Professor Bethany Berger's excellent study, Justice and the
Outsider, provides some of the first empirical scholarship on the
outcomes for nonmembers in tribal court cases. 128 Professor Berger
analyzed the decisions of the Navajo Nation's tribal courts where a
nonmember (she uses the term "outsider") is a party. 129 In ninety-
five Navajo Nation Supreme Court opinions where a non-Navajo
party opposed a Navajo party, the non-Navajo party won half of the
cases. 13  Relying upon a theory that parties with accurate
information "will settle or fail to pursue cases in which they agree
that one party is significantly more likely to win," 13 1 Berger
concludes that "non-Navajo parties are at least as good at predicting
their chances of success as are Navajo parties."' 32 The result "tends
to undermine the assumption that the courts are unfair to these
outsiders."' 133 If tribal courts do not provide a significant local
advantage to tribal members over nonmembers, why is this so?
B. Custom and Traditional Law and Outsiders
Tribal custom and traditional law may be difficult for
nonmembers to understand, but tribal custom and tradition tends to
have little or no application in cases involving nonmembers. The
modern tribal court cases that rely upon tribal custom and tradition as
127 E.g., Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir.
1999) (railroad accident involving death of tribal members); Ford Motor Co. v.
Todocheene, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (D. Ariz. 2002) (automobile accident involving
tribal members).
128 Professor Berger identifies a few previous empirical analyses of tribal
court decisions such as Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the
Paradox of Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REv. 1109 (2004); Newton,
supra note 4; Rosen, supra note 5.
129 See Berger, supra note 5.
10 See Berger, supra note 5, at 1075.
131 Berger, supra note 5, at 1076 (citing George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein,
The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1984)).
132 Berger, supra note 5, at 1077.
133 Berger, supra note 5, at 1077.
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a form of common law precedent tend to involve tribal lands and
internal tribal political matters - in other words, disputes between
members or the tribe. On the other hand, tribal courts involving
nonmembers tend to rely upon either federal or state common law or
tribal laws that mirror federal and state law. Some tribes divert cases
arising out traditional or customary law to "traditional" or "quasi-
modem" tribal courts. 1
34
A review of recent tribal court opinions suggests that the
cases can be grouped into several major classifications. First, there
are the civil rights cases brought by members or nonmembers against
a tribe, tribal entity, or tribal officers. In the last decade or more,
these cases tend to arise out of employment relationships gone
awry. 35 Second, there are tort cases brought by both members and
nonmembers. Third, there are the internal political cases regarding
elections, membership and disenrollment, alleged corruption, and
law reform. Fourth, there are criminal cases. And fifth, there are
family law cases. Members are the exclusive parties in the large
majority of cases under the last three categories, while both members
and nonmembers tend to be parties in the first two categories. Each
of these classifications will be analyzed in turn.
First, the civil rights cases, by definition, arise out of the
American legal notion that individuals should have certain rights and
privileges against the actions of government.' 36 These cases are
brought under the Indian Civil Rights Act or tribal statutory or
common law recognizing individual rights. 137 The Anglo-American
conception of due process is at the heart of these claims.' 38 The
government structures and relationships to individuals at issue -
134 See Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society, 79
JUDICATURE 126, 130 (Nov.-Dec. 1995).
135 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Employment Separation: Tribal Law
Enigma, Tribal Governance Paradox, and Tribal Court Conundrum, 38 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 273 (2005).
136 See generally Alvin J. Ziontz, In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An
Analysis of Judicial Error in Construction of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 20 S.D.
L. REV. 1, 3-8 (1975).
137 Fletcher, supra note 59.
138 Id.
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often administrative and business entities making decisions about
employment and other economic interests of individuals - derive
from American models. 139 The entire background of these cases
derives from Anglo-American law and relationships.140 Often tribes
did not choose these models; tribes exist in a world where these
models constitute the entire range of choice, forcing tribes to enter
these arenas. 14 1 And tribes have done so in a manner that, for many
tribes, they make or alter with some of their own traditions and
culture.142 Here is the rub, according to Justice Souter, because tribal
courts hearing cases arising out of these Anglo-American structures
do not interpret or apply due process "jot-for-jot" with state and
federal courts. 
143
The easy answer is that tribal courts' interpretation is well
within the parameters of due process that state and federal courts
apply. Due process is one of the more subjective legal doctrines in
the law. State and federal courts tend to apply a balancing test,
reaching results that differ from other courts in often dramatic
144
ways.
A California resident and citizen, where the notion of
"substantive due process" is incorporated into the state's
constitutional law, 145 might be subject to a United States Supreme
Court still cringing from its own substantive due process
jurisprudence. 146 Due process as envisioned by the framers of the
Constitution might be nothing like the due process the Court now
applies. 147 Why should Justice Souter hold Indian tribes to a "jot-for-
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 id.
142 id.
143 Hicks, 353 U.S. at 383.
144 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
145 E.g., In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 725-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
146 E.g., College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 690-91 (1999).
147 See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 15-38 (2005); John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights:
A Century of Progress, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 15 (1992).
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jot" standard when state and federal courts cannot do the same?
While the Oglala Sioux tribal court might not apply due process the
same way as the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians tribal
court, they might apply the doctrine the same as Idaho, South
Dakota, or Michigan courts. Nonmembers need not worry.
A review of published tribal court civil rights cases indicates
that tribal courts define "due process" within American constitutional
parameters. Employment cases, because there are so many, provide
an excellent data set supporting the notion that tribal courts apply
either American common law or tribal law that mirrors American
common law in all important and relevant ways. Tribal courts
adjudicate employment claims brought by individuals, both members
and nonmembers, against a tribe, tribal entity, or tribal official
following American law or tribal law mirroring American law. 148 As
an aside, most tribal business operations catering to nonmember
customers and clients adopt and incorporate state and local law into
tribal codes and ordinances, a necessary cost of doing business.
149
Most tribal business operations also waive sovereign immunity for
the same reason. 150 While some cases of apparent unfairness reach
the news when a nonmember's claim is dismissed, most of the time
that claimant's attorney failed to follow the procedures contained in
the limited waivers of immunity required by the tribal business or
government. ' 5' Moreover, even tribal courts applying common law
tend to adopt the tort law of state and local courts when adjudicating
the merits of the tort claims involving nonmembers. 152 Nonmembers
148 See Fletcher, supra note 135, at 289-93.
149 See Wenona T. Singel, Cultural Sovereignty and Transplanted Law:
Tensions in Indigenous Self-Rule, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 357 (2006).
150 See David D. Haddock & Robert J. Miller, Can a Sovereign Protect
Investors From Itself? Tribal Institutions to Spur Reservation Investment, 8 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 173, 194-95 (2004).
151 E.g., Chapo v. Navajo Nation, No. SC-CV-68-00 (Navajo Nation Supreme
Court 2004); Jenkins v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, I Mash. 7
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Court 1993), available at http://www.tribal-
institute.org/opinions/ 1993.NAMP.0000001 .htm.
152 See Venus McGhee Prince, Making the Gaming Business a "Safe Bet"for
Indian Tribes, 9 GAMING L. REV. 314 (2005).
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suffer no more prejudice in tribal courts than they would in any state
or local court.
In contrast, cases involving reservation land disputes between
members may be resolved through the application of tribal
customary and traditional law. 153 Dean Newton's discussion of tribal
courts that do not follow Supreme Court precedent 'jot-for-jot"
included a case where the tribal court provided more expansive due
process protections than American law, not less.
Hall v. Tribal Business Council is illustrative. In Hall, the
Fort Berthold District Court noted that in the context of Indian land,
tribal member applicants for grazing unit leases have a due process
right "to be treated culturally and legally with dignity and
appropriate fairness," traditions that "are central to the history of the
Three Affiliated Tribes." The Hall court held that this tradition
created a property interest triggering the fair procedures required by
the due process clause because these traditions create a legitimate
expectation for all tribal members that they will be eligible for
grazing leases. 154 Since these cases almost never involve
nonmembers as parties, the application of law that would confuse
nonmembers is not a concern. 1 55
There is another category of tribal court cases that is
insignificant now, but will become more important in the coming
years -business and contract cases. 156 It is worth mentioning here
because of the increasing capacity and willingness of Indian tribes to
conduct business with nonmembers. Of these developing
relationships, the critical example is private financing of tribal
153 Id.
154 Newton, supra note 5, at 344 (quoting Hall v. Tribal Bus. Council, 23
Indian L. Rep. 6039 (Fort Berthold Dist. Ct. 1996).
155 E.g., Justin B. Richland, "What Are You Going to do with the Village's
Knowledge?" Talking Tradition, Talking Law in Hopi Tribal Court, 39 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 235 (2005).
156 E.g., Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde v. Strategic Wealth Mgmt., Inc.,
32 Indian L. Rep. 6148 (Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Community of
Oregon Tribal Ct. 2005); Bank of Hoeven v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co.,
Inc., 32 Indian L. Rep. 6001 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 2004).
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business enterprises. 157 Like the employment cases involving
nonmembers, these cases will involve American law on an exclusive
basis. 158 While Indian tribes tend to require that disputes over these
business relationships be adjudicated in tribal courts in exchange for
waivers of sovereign immunity, lenders tend to require Indian tribes
to adopt tribal codes and rules that mirror American law. 159 Tribal
courts will be adjudicating disputes over these business relationships
with nonmembers applying American law once again.
The lesson of this section is that tribal courts tend to apply
tribal law analogous to state and federal law in cases involving
nonmembers. Tribal courts apply tribal custom and tradition, if ever,
where the parties are tribal members or tribal entities. Justice
Souter's allegation that tribal law is "unusually difficult for an
outsider to sort out" overstates the claim. 1
60
C. Tribal Substantive Law & Tribal Court Procedures
While the application of the different types of tribal
substantive law depends, for the most part, on whether the parties are
members or nonmembers, tribal court procedures tend to apply to all
parties. There is an exception to this rule for certain kinds of tribal
court proceedings, such as Peacemaker Courts, but those proceedings
tend to involve members and are voluntary. 161
Tribal courts follow court rules and procedures that mirror, in
most important ways, American court rules and procedures. Many
tribal courts have incorporated, as their own, federal or state rules of
civil and criminal procedure with few or minor modifications.' 62 The
157 See Townsend Hyatt, Perry E. Israel & Alan Benjamin, An Introduction to
Indian Tribal Finance (2005), available at http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/
246.pdf#search-%22An%20Introduction%20to%20Indian%2OTribal%2OFinance
%22.
158 id.
159 See Singel, supra note 149, at 360.
160 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 385 (Souter, J., concurring).
161 E.g., Nancy A. Costello, Walking Together in a Good Way: Indian
Peacemaker Courts in Michigan, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 875 (1999).
162 See Kevin K. Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission's Treatment of
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same is true for rules of evidence and general court rules. Like the
interpretation of due process, the application of these rules is well
within the parameters of difference between the various federal
district courts and state and local courts. 163 In fact, most tribal courts
tend to adopt a more liberal interpretation of these rules with a
disapproving eye toward dismissing or prejudicing claims for
technical rules violations. 164 Unlike Anglo-American legal systems,
which evolved from courts where lawyers and judges spoke a
language of rigorous procedure tending to exclude non-experts, tribal
courts evolved from courts where non-law-trained advocates and
judges spoke more toward the merits instead of technical rules. 165
Once again, the realities on the ground of tribal court
adjudication tend to dispel the notion that tribal law is prejudicial to
outsiders. Most Members of the Court are ignorant of these on-the-
ground realities, compelling them to be suspicious of tribal law and
procedure.
IV Toward Preserving Tribal Law's Jurisgenerative Value
This Article proposes that the Court should affirm the
National Farmers Union presumption. In addition, this Article
proposes that the Court modify the federal common law rule that
federal courts have jurisdiction to determine whether a tribal court
has civil jurisdiction over nonmembers to allow for a review of the
tribal court procedures on the merits. The Court could adopt a rule
that, if the tribal court followed procedures within the parameters of
Tribal Courts, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 209, 209-20 (2005).
161 See Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of
Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 285 (1998).
164 E.g., Mathiason v. Gate City Bank, No. TMAC 04-2002, at 4 (Turtle
Mountain Band Ct. App. 2005), available at http://www.turtle-
mountain.cc.nd.us/cases.htm (last visited January 15, 2006).
165 In the experience of the author, tribal court judges tend to overlook
technical violations of court rules where no party can show prejudice. See, e.g.,
Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Zeke Fletcher, A Restatement of the Common Law of the
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, 7 TRIBAL L. J.
(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at §§ 21.04[B]; 21.04(l)), available at
http://www. law.msu.edu/indigenous/papers/2007-02.pdf.
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the American notion of due process, then the tribal court decision
will stand.
A. Presuming Tribal Court Jurisdiction
Absent the recognition that tribal traditions and customs tend
not to apply to nonmembers, the Court may very well follow Justice
Souter's suggestion that nonmembers should not be subject to tribal
law. Tribal advocates should educate the Court that tribal law that
applies to nonmembers is not difficult for nonmembers. That
education will go a long way toward convincing the Court to adopt
the National Farmers Union presumption, but it might need
additional support.
B. A Limited Federal Court Review of Tribal Court Procedures
A limited federal court review of tribal court procedures,
modification of the Court's current tribal court exhaustion doctrine,
offers a concession to the Court and serves to allay the Justices'
concerns that application of tribal law subjects nonmembers to
unfairness in tribal courts. Under the current doctrine, the federal
courts will review whether a tribal court has jurisdiction over a
nonmember in cases arising on tribal lands after that nonmember has
exhausted his or her tribal court remedies. 166 In other words, the
doctrine is both a benefit and a detriment to tribal court development,
forcing nonmembers to litigate in tribal courts before seeking federal
relief, but also tending to waste court and litigant resources and time.
Then, when the case reaches federal court, the federal court has no
jurisdiction over the merits of the decision.
This Article proposes to extend federal court jurisdiction to
the extent that the federal court may determine whether the tribal
court's application of tribal court procedures are consistent with
American constitutional due process notions. It is this Article's
contention that the written rules and procedures are already
166 See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); National Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
20071
HeinOnline -- 2 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 125 2007
126 INTERCULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 2
consistent with American due process. Federal courts would review
whether the tribal court followed its own procedures. The
presumption that tribal courts have civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers eliminates the often wasteful need for nonmember
litigants to exhaust tribal court remedies.
Substantive tribal law would remain outside the scope of
federal court review. The substantive tribal law that applies to
nonmembers already mirrors American law and should not be a
problem for nonmembers. But to ensure that federal courts do not
trample on the substantive law choices of Indian tribes, this area is
off limits.
As far as fairness is concerned, nonmembers and the Court
should be satisfied with federal court review of tribal court
procedures.
V Conclusion: Tribal Sovereignty is Tribal Law
None of these proposals will work unless the Court's
concerns about the alleged "democratic deficit" in tribal politics and
the "unusual difficulty" of tribal law are solved. Educating the
federal judiciary about this subject that few federal judges, few elite
law schools, professors, and law journals, and few lawyers care
about is difficult.
What this education should focus on is the fact that tribal law
is tribal culture. Without the development of tribal law - and a law
different and unique to tribal people and communities - tribal culture
is doomed to a slow decline into assimilation. Perhaps the notion of
tribal sovereignty that served as a rallying cry for Indian people and
advocates through the end of the Termination Era and into the Self-
Determination Era should be retired. As many tribal court judges
have recognized, the notion of sovereignty and sovereign immunity
derives from the Anglo-American notion that the King can do no
wrong. Indian tribes with kings did not survive, and the modern
tribal notion of government excludes monarchs and dictators. Tribal
law, on the other hand, has always been linked in an inextricable
manner with tribal culture. Recognition of this theory goes a long
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way toward reversing the trend of the Court to limiting the
jurisdiction of tribal courts.
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